Archive for March, 2022

Vieni sutapimai Ukrainos kare.

Šiandien neveikia 46,6 (6) procentų Ukrainos atominių reaktorių.

6 buvo atjungti vasario 21 dieną: Zaporožės AE 3, Rovno AE1, Pietų Ukrainos 1, Chmelnickio 1.

Rusai įėję į Zaporožės AE, atjungė dar vieną. Ar dar du, o vieną kuris buvo atjungtas įjungėm iš viso šiandien neveikia 7 reaktoriai iš 15.

Tačiau Europai į pagalbą ateina daugelį metų marinuotas Olkiluoto.

Olkiluoto turi “rusai puola” istoriją, kai Rosatomui statant ir Tatena dagus visus leidimus, ta statyba įstrigo, ir po to jėgainę perėmė Aveva, prancūzų įmonė, ir statybos užšalo, užšalo ir reaktoriaus pajungimas.

Filadelfijai rašo, jog trečias reaktorius buvo pajungtas kovo 12 dieną prie nacionalinio tinklo

Iš tikrųjų Olkiluotas turėjo turėti 5 reaktorius, turėjo būti Estlinkas, ir mes Lietuvoje turėjome namus ir šiltnamius ir saunas šildytis suomiška pigia elektra, bet dėl įvairių provokacijų to deja neįvyko ir turbūt neįvyks.

Aš pavyzdžiui pakėlus beprotiškai elektros kainas, nuo jos beveik atsijungiau, ir viską darau su natūralia energetika iš gamtos, ir taip sutaupau labai daug pinigų. Net namą reikalui esant galima apsišviesti su židiniu, įrengiant tam tikras groteles.

21 amžius, bet ar mes nuėjome pirmyn su šitais žaidimais su elektra. Tikrai ne.

Tätä on odotettu – lisää kotimaista sähköntuotantoa! Olkiluoto 3 EPR -laitosyksikön sähköntuotanto on alkanut. OL3 on liitetty valtakunnan verkkoon lauantaina 12. maaliskuuta 2022 klo 12.01.

Suomen suurin ilmastoteko OL3 parantaa merkittävästi Suomen sähköomavaraisuutta ja auttaa hiilineutraaliustavoitteiden saavuttamisessa.

OL3:n reaktori käynnistettiin 21. joulukuuta 2021 ja sen jälkeen tehotasoa on nostettu portaittain noin 27 prosentin tasolle. Laitosyksikkö liitettiin valtakunnan verkkoon 103 MW:n teholla.

Verkkoon liittämisen hetki oli odotettu. Suomessa uusi ydinvoimalaitos otettiin käyttöön viimeksi yli neljä vuosikymmentä sitten.

Lue lisää: https://www.tvo.fi/…/olkiluoto3epr…

#OL3connected#suomensuurinilmastoteko#olkiluoto

Rodyti vertimą

Gali būti tekstas „SUOMEN MSTOE SUURIN tvo“ vaizdas

335335

12 komentarų

66 bendrinimai

Patinka

Komentuoti

Bendrinti

Aktyvus (-i)

Uraania louhitaan ja jalostetaan paljon Venäjällä?

Ukraine informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it had lost today all communications with the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), the day after the Russian-controlled site lost all external power supplies, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said.

The Director General said that the Agency is aware of reports that power has now been restored to the site and is looking for confirmation.

Earlier in the day, the Ukraine regulatory authority had told the IAEA that emergency diesel generators were providing electricity to the Chornobyl NPP. The subsequent loss of communication meant that the regulator could no longer provide updated information about the site to the IAEA.

According to the information received before the loss of communication, both of the site’s power lines had been damaged, in effect disconnecting it from the grid, the Ukraine’s regulatory authority said. To ensure continued power, these lines would either need to be repaired or the generators holding fuel for two days would require additional diesel deliveries. The diesel generators were powering systems important for safety, including those for spent nuclear fuel and water control and chemical water treatment, the regulatory authority said, adding that the operator was not able to maintain some functions such as radiation monitoring, ventilation systems, and normal lighting.

Nevertheless, as reported in Update 16, the disconnection from the grid will not have a critical impact on essential safety functions at the site, where various radioactive waste management facilities are located, as the volume of cooling water in the spent fuel facility is sufficient to maintain heat removal without a supply of electricity.

The regulator further confirmed this assessment, stating that the safety analysis report for the site’s spent fuel storage facility concluded that there would be “no impact on essential safety systems” in the case of a total loss of power, including electricity provided by emergency sources such as diesel generators. Furthermore, the operator has also been able to confirm that there are no damages in the structures and systems of the spent fuel storage pool, and their original functions are maintained.

If emergency power was also to be lost, the regulator said it would still be possible for staff to monitor the water level and temperature of the spent fuel pool. But they would carry out this work under worsening radiation safety conditions due to a lack of ventilation at the facility. They would also not be able to follow operational radiation safety procedures.

The Director General has expressed alarm about the deteriorating and exhausting conditions for staff at the Chornobyl NPP, who have not been able to rotate since the day before Russian forces took control on 24 February. He has said this is also compromising a vital safety pillar, which states that “operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure”. Further adding to the stressful situation is the total loss of communication. The site had earlier been able to communicate with the regulator by email.

Regarding the status of Ukraine’s operational nuclear power plants, the regulator said eight of the country’s 15 reactors remained operating, including two at the Zaporizhzhya NPP, three at Rivne, one at Khmelnytskyy, and two at South Ukraine. Radiation levels at the four sites were normal, it said.

The Zaporizhzhya NPP site power supply situation is unchanged from that reported in Update 16. The site has four high voltage (750 kV) offsite power lines plus an additional one on standby.  Two of the four have been damaged and therefore currently there are two power lines, plus the one on standby. The operator informed the IAEA that the NPP off-site power needs could be provided with one power line available. Furthermore, diesel generators are ready and functional to provide back-up power.

However, in another challenge for the same plant, it was not currently possible to deliver necessary spare parts, equipment and specialized personnel to the site to carry out planned repairs, and maintenance activities at Unit 1 had been reduced to the minimum level required by the plant operational procedures.

The Director General also said that the IAEA is in contact with Ukraine authorities regarding radiation monitoring systems in Ukraine.

Regarding the loss of remote data transmission from the safeguards systems installed to monitor nuclear material and activities at the Chernobyl NPP and Zaporizhzhya NPP, reported in Update 16, the IAEA has not been able to re-establish communication with those installed monitoring systems.

Director General Grossi today held talks with the Foreign Ministers of Ukraine and the Russian Federation – Dmytro Kuleba and Sergei Lavrov – in Antalya, Turkey. He held a press conference upon his return to Vienna.

https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-17-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine

Nuclear Power in Ukraine

(Updated March 2022)


In February 2022, Russia launched a military operation against Ukraine. For further information see page on Russian Military Operation and Ukraine’s Nuclear Plants.


  • Ukraine is heavily dependent on nuclear energy – it has 15 reactors generating about half of its electricity.
  • Ukraine receives most of its nuclear services and nuclear fuel from Russia, but is reducing this dependence by buying fuel from Westinghouse.
  • In 2004 Ukraine commissioned two large new reactors. The government plans to maintain the nuclear share in electricity production to 2030, which will involve substantial new build.
  • In 2021 Westinghouse was contracted to finish building a new reactor at Khmelnitsky using AP1000 components from an aborted US project.
  • The government is looking to the West for both technology and investment in its nuclear plants. Westinghouse has an agreement to build four AP1000 reactors at established sites.

Operable Reactors

15

13,107 MWe

Reactors Under Construction

2

2,070 MWe

Reactors Shutdown

4

3,515 MWe

 

Operable nuclear power capacity

19701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821983198419851986198719881989199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022Year02,0004,0006,0008,00010,00012,000Reference Unit Power MWe013,107

Electricity sector

Total generation (in 2019): 154 TWh

Generation mix: nuclear 83.0 TWh (54%); coal 45.4 TWh (29%); hydro 7.9 TWh (5%); natural gas 11.9 TWh (8%); solar 2.9 TWh (2%); wind 2.0 TWh (1%); biofuels & waste 0.4 TWh.

Import/export balance: 4.0 TWh net export.

Total consumption: 117 TWh

Per capita consumption: c. 2600 kWh in 2019.

Source: International Energy Agency and The World Bank. Data for year 2019.

Total capacity in 2019 was about 51 GWe, including 22 GWe coal-fired, 13.8 GWe nuclear, 6.3 GWe hydro, 5 GWe gas, 1.9 GWe hydro and 0.8 GWe wind. Much of the coal-fired plant is old and with unconstrained emissions, and nearly half of it is due to close down. A new 750 kV link from Rovno to Kiev was commissioned in December 2015, and allowed the Rovno and Khmelnitski plants to operate at full power (4840 MWe gross) for the first time.

Energy policy

A large share of primary energy supply in Ukraine comes from the country’s uranium and substantial coal resources. The remainder is oil and gas, mostly imported from Russia, but increasingly from the European Union (EU). In 1991, due to the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the country’s economy collapsed and its electricity generation declined dramatically from 296 TWh in 1990 to 170 TWh in 2000, all the decrease being from coal and gas plants. In December 2005 Ukraine and the EU signed an energy cooperation agreement which links the country more strongly to western Europe in respect to both nuclear energy and electricity supply. Ukraine has investigated developing its significant shale gas deposits, but domestic production remains modest.

In mid-2012 the Ukraine energy strategy to 2030 was updated, and 5000-7000 MWe of new nuclear capacity was proposed by 2030, costing some $25 billion. A major increase in electricity demand to 307 TWh per year by 2020 and 420 TWh by 2030 was envisaged, and government policy was to continue supplying half of this from nuclear power. This would have required 29.5 GWe of nuclear capacity in 2030, up from 13.8 GWe (13.1 GWe net) through to 2021. The new government formed in 2014 confirmed these targets, and said that Ukraine aimed to integrate with the European power grid and gas network to make the country part of the European energy market by 2017, but this is technically and politically complicated and has not yet proceeded. A further update of energy strategy in August 2017 put the nuclear share of electricity at about 50% to 2035, with hydro 13% and other renewables 25%.

In February 2021 the government confirmed the need for three more nuclear power reactors, notably completing Khmelnitsky 3&4 and building Rovno 5 to replace the two older units there, as well as implementing the ‘energy bridge’ project to Poland and Hungary. 

Ukraine-EU ‘energy bridge’ (Energomost)

In March 2015 an agreement was signed by Ukraine’s Ukrenergo distribution company and Polenergia, a Polish counterpart, to export electricity as part of the Ukraine-European Union ‘energy bridge’, and related to the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan. This would enable greater use of Ukraine’s nuclear capacity and is to generate funds to pay for increasing that capacity at Khmelnitski by completing units 3&4. The plan is for a 750 kV, 2000 MW transmission connection from Khmelnistki 2 to Rzeszow in Poland, taking in also Ukraine’s Burshtyn coal-fired plant in the far west of the country, with Khmelnistki 2 then being disconnected from the Ukraine grid and synchronized with the EU grid, as Burshtyn already is*. Albertirsa in Hungary is also to be linked. In June 2015 the government approved the project, but it has not yet proceeded.

* The 2300 MWe Burshtyn power station was disconnected from the national grid in 2002 to form the Burshtyn Energy Island, synchronized with the EU grid – ENTSO-E – and with a 400 kV connection to Hungary, Slovakia and Romania and a HVDC link proposed. Replacement of one-third of its old capacity with a new supercritical unit is proposed. However, Burshtyn partly relies on coal from eastern Ukraine mines now controlled by pro-Russian rebels. In 2017, 550 MWe effective capacity was reported.

The project consortium comprises Polenergia, EdF Trading and Westinghouse, which had already assisted in its feasibility study. The estimated project cost is $2.6 billion.

In August 2016 Energoatom signed an agreement with Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP), one objective of which is to cooperate in the Ukraine-EU energy bridge project, as well as completing Khmelnitski 3&4. In September 2020 KHNP was proposing to build an APR1400 reactor at Rovno.

Nuclear power industry

Reactors operating in Ukraine

NameModelReactor TypeReference Unit Power (MWe)Grid Connection
Khmelnitski 1VVER V-320PWR9501987-12
Khmelnitski 2VVER V-320PWR9502004-08
Rivne 1VVER V-213PWR3811980-12
Rivne 2VVER V-213PWR3761981-12
Rivne 3VVER V-320PWR9501986-12
Rivne 4VVER V-320PWR9502004-10
South Ukraine 1VVER V-302PWR9501982-12
South Ukraine 2VVER V-338PWR9501985-01
South Ukraine 3VVER V-320PWR9501989-09
Zaporizhzhia 1VVER V-320PWR9501984-12
Zaporizhzhia 2VVER V-320PWR9501985-07
Zaporizhzhia 3VVER V-320PWR9501986-12
Zaporizhzhia 4VVER V-320PWR9501987-12
Zaporizhzhia 5VVER V-320PWR9501989-08
Zaporizhzhia 6VVER V-320PWR9501995-10

https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/ukraine.aspx

Ukraina su vasario 21 dienos daugybinėmis atominių reaktorių avarijomis, planais nuatakuoti genocido vykdymo vietą Rytų Ukrainą išprovokavo Rusiją karinei operacijai, ir kaip aiškėja – labai panašu, dėmesiui nuo Irano problemų, kai Iraas neatsisako kurti atominę bombą, nukreipti

Explainer: How close is Iran to being able to build a nuclear bomb?

By Francois Murphy

VIENNA, Feb 22 (Reuters) – Indirect talks between Tehran and Washington to revive the 2015 Iran nuclear deal are in the home straight, delegates say, though some important issues remain unresolved and it is still unclear whether an agreement will be clinched.

Since then-President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the accord in 2018 and reimposed sanctions, Iran has breached many of the deal’s curbs that had extended the time it would need to produce enough fissile material for an atom bomb – if it chose to build one – to at least a year from 2-3 months.

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-close-is-iran-being-able-build-nuclear-bomb-2022-02-22/

Iran, IAEA agree timeline to remove obstacle to reviving nuclear deal

  • Iran tried to end IAEA investigation in nuclear talks
  • It has now agreed three-month roadmap with agency
  • Obstacle to a nuclear agreement within days removed
  • Unclear what happens if roadmap only partially successful

VIENNA, March 5 (Reuters) – Iran and the U.N. nuclear watchdog on Saturday agreed a three-month plan that in the best case will resolve the long-stalled issue of uranium particles found at old but undeclared sites in the country, removing an obstacle to reviving the Iran nuclear deal.

Eleven months after indirect talks between Iran and the United States on salvaging the 2015 deal began in Vienna, delegates are trying to settle the final thorny issues within days as Western powers say time is running out since Iran’s nuclear advances will soon make the deal redundant.

https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iaea-chief-says-nuclear-deal-not-possible-until-iran-resolves-its-issues-with-2022-03-05/